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Abstract
Most existing decision-making models assume that choice behavior is based on pref-
erence maximization even when the preferences are incomplete. In this paper we
study an alternative approach - justiﬁable choice: each agent has several prefer-
ence relations (justiﬁcations), and she can use each justiﬁcation in every choice
problem. We present a new behavioral property that requires an alternative to be
chosen if it is not inferior to all mixtures of chosen alternatives, and show that
this property characterizes justiﬁable choice. The main application of this property
yields a multiple-utility representation, which substantially diﬀers from existing re-
lated representations. In addition, we obtain a multiple-prior representation, and
study the notions of indecisiveness and being more decisive.
Key words: menu eﬀects, incomplete preferences, multiple utilities, multiple priors,
indecisiveness, non-binary choice, tradeoﬀ contrast eﬀect.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81
1 Introduction
In several disciplines, there has been signiﬁcant interest in decision-making models in
which one's preferences are allowed to be incomplete, thereby letting the decision maker re-
main indecisive on occasion (see, e.g., Roemer, 1999; Rigotti and Shannon, 2005; Mandler,
2005; Manzini and Mariotti, 2007; Salant and Rubinstein, 2008; Bernheim and Rangel,
2009). Most such models assume that the decision maker maximizes an incomplete pref-
erence relation (see, e.g., Aumann, 1962; Bewley, 2002; Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok, 2004;
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Eliaz and Ok, 2006). 2
However, upon relaxation of the completeness axiom, it is not clear why preference maxi-
mization should be deemed as the proper characterization of rational behavior. An alter-
native approach for choice with incomplete preferences is justiﬁable choice (see, Lehrer and
Teper, 2011). According to this approach, the decision maker has several complete prefer-
ence relations called justiﬁcations (or rationales). Additional payoﬀ-irrelevant information
that is available during the choice process determines which justiﬁcation is used, 3 and the
decision maker selects the best element according to this rationale. We assume that each
justiﬁcation can be used in every choice problem. Justiﬁable choice diﬀers from preference
maximization in two key aspects: (1) it allows the revealed preferences to depend on the
menu, and (2) it does not allow the simultaneous use of conﬂicting rationales.
In this paper we present a new behavioral property: convex axiom of revealed non-
inferiority (henceforth, CARNI ), and show that it characterizes justiﬁable choice.
1.1 New Behavioral Property (CARNI)
In our framework, choice behavior is described by a choice correspondence C which selects,
in each closed set of alternatives, a non-empty subset of choosable alternatives. We say
that alternative x is revealed inferior to alternative y, if x is never chosen when y is a
mixture of alternatives in the choice set. The new axiom we propose, convex axiom of
revealed non-inferiority (CARNI), requires that an alternative be chosen if it is revealed
not to be inferior to all the mixtures of the chosen alternatives. In Subsection 2.2 we study
the relationships between CARNI and existing axioms.
We present two motivations for CARNI: one normative and one descriptive. Our main
model uses the framework of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), where each choice
set includes lotteries over a ﬁnite set of consequences. In some situations, decision makers
may use internal randomization devices. In such situations, when a decision maker has to
select one of the elements in A, she may base her choice on a private lottery (i.e., tossing a
coin), and by doing this, she can induce compound lotteries. If the decision maker satisﬁes
reduction of compound lotteries, then these compound lotteries are equivalent to mixtures
of alternatives in A, and CARNI has a normative appeal.
A descriptive appeal of CARNI is that it captures one aspect of the tradeoﬀ contrast
eﬀect of Simonson and Tversky (1992). According to this eﬀect, the tendency to choose
an alternative is hindered (or enhanced) if the tradeoﬀs within the set under consideration
are unfavorable (or favorable) to that option. One aspect of this bias is described in Figure
1 (where each axis represents a positive attribute). Because the contrast between the x-y
tradeoﬀ and the x-z and y-z tradeoﬀs is unfavorable to object z, it is expected to fare
worse (to be chosen less often) in the triple than in the pairs. That is, z fares worse
2 Eliaz and Ok (2006) assume it explicitly. The other papers use an incomplete preference relation
as the primitive of the model, and by that, implicitly assume that choice behavior is determined
by maximizing this relation.
3 We do not explicitly model the process in which payoﬀ-irrelevant information determines the
justiﬁcation. Some examples for such processes are: framing eﬀect (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981), availability heuristics, and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
2
Figure 1. Contrast Tradeoﬀ Detraction
because it is inferior to a mixture of other alternatives in the choice set. CARNI captures
a binary version of this aspect: an element is chosen if it is not inferior to mixtures of
alternatives in the choice set.
We note, that this descriptive appeal of CARNI is somewhat limited because: (1) CARNI
does not capture other aspects of the tradeoﬀ contrast eﬀect, such as the attraction eﬀect
and the compromise eﬀect (see de-Clippel and Eliaz, 2011 for an axiomatic model that
captures these aspects); (2) the experimental evidence for the tradeoﬀ contrast eﬀect is
for choice between multi-attribute products (Simonson and Tversky, 1992, 1993), while
we apply it to choice between lotteries; in a separate note (Heller, 2010) we present some
experimental evidence that suggests the existence of a moderate degree of this eﬀect also
for choice between lotteries.
Our main result shows that satisfying three standard axioms (non-triviality, continuity,
and independence) and CARNI is equivalent to the following multiple-utility representa-
tion: There exists a unique convex and compact set of vN-M utility functions, such that
a lottery is selected if it is best with respect to one of these utilities. 4
1.2 Comparison With Existing Multiple-Utility Representation
Eliaz and Ok (2006) presented a closely related preference maximization model. Their key
axiom, weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI), is similar to CARNI except that
it does not relate to mixtures. It requires that an alternative be chosen if it is revealed not
to be inferior to all of the chosen alternatives. This yields the following representation:
There exists a convex set of vN-M utilities, such that lottery q is chosen if no lottery in
the choice set is strictly better than q with respect to all of these utilities. In the following
paragraphs we detail the two key aspects in which our model diﬀers from theirs: menu
eﬀects and conﬂicting rationales.
Recently, Manzini and Mariotti (2010) experimentally tested how people violate the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP). Speciﬁcally, they divide the possible violations of
WARP into two groups: 1) pairwise inconsistency - choices over pairs of alternatives are
not transitive; and 2) menu eﬀects - choices over two-element sets do not induce choices
4 A similar representation was presented non-axiomatically in Levi (1974).
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over larger sets. Manzini and Mariotti show that menu eﬀects are largely responsible for
failures of WARP, and they conclude that on the basis of their data, any procedure that
fails to account for menu eﬀects will not make a signiﬁcant improvement of the standard
maximization model. WARNI implies that choices must be consistent with preference
maximization, 5 and thus it cannot account for menu eﬀects. CARNI presents a small
deviation from WARP that is able to accommodate an interesting menu eﬀect, while re-
taining a normative appeal.
In Eliaz and Ok's representation an alternative can be chosen based on the simultaneous
use of conﬂicting rationales: lottery q can be chosen in the triple {q, r, r′} if it is better
than r according to one utility, and better than r′ according to a diﬀerent utility, even
though q does not maximize any utility. In our model, an element can be chosen only if
it maximizes one of the utilities. This seems more natural in many choice situations. One
example for such a situation, which is described in Lehrer and Teper (2011), is decisions in
large-scale organizations, where responsibility for diﬀerent choices is delegated to diﬀerent
employees, each employee has a diﬀerent rationale, and all rationales are consistent with
the organization's common information and policy. Another example for such a situation
is the following.
Example 1 There are four consequences: bn=beef near, bf=beef far, cn=chicken
near, cf=chicken far. Let q be a 50:50 lottery with prizes bf and cf . Assume that the
decision maker may like either chicken or beef (two justiﬁcations) and also dislikes eating
too far from home. Then q may beat bn based on the chicken justiﬁcation (that is,
{bn, q} = C ({bn, q})); similarly, q may beat cn based on the beef rationale ({cn, q} =
C ({cn, q})). But intuitively, if both bn and cn are available, q should not be chosen
({bn, cn} = C ({bn, cn, q})): the decision maker can get her favorite meal at a nearby
restaurant, regardless of whether she wants beef or chicken. Observe, that this choice
behavior is consistent with CARNI (q is not chosen in the triple because it is inferior
to the mixture of bn and cn), and is inconsistent with WARNI (as WARNI implies:
q ∈ C ({bn, q}) and q ∈ C ({cn, q}) ⇒ q ∈ C ({bn, cn, q})).
1.3 Other Related Literature
Our paper is related and inspired by two strands of literature. The ﬁrst is the literature
studying choice with incomplete preferences and multiple rationales (e.g., Nehring, 1997;
Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler, 2002; Mandler, 2005; Manzini and Mariotti, 2007; Salant
and Rubinstein, 2008; and Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni, 2010). In most of these
papers, the model only describes choices from subsets of an arbitrary ﬁnite set of outcomes,
and little structure is imposed on the diﬀerent rationales. In this paper, we assume that
there is also data about the choices from lotteries over outcomes, and this allows us to
impose more structure on the justiﬁcations: the set of justiﬁcations is convex and closed,
and each justiﬁcation is a complete and aﬃne preorder.
The second strand of literature generalizes expected utility and subjective expected utility
by weakening some of its assumptions (e.g., Machina, 1982; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989;
5 That is, alternative q is chosen in menu A if and only if it is chosen in any couple {q, r} for
each element r in A.
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Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci 2004; Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and
Mukerji, 2005; Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini, 2006; Gilboa et al., 2010; Ok,
Ortoleva, Riella, 2012). Most of this literature weakens the independence axiom, and
keep the weak axiom of revealed preference. In this paper we do the opposite (a similar
approach is used in Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane, 2010).
1.4 Structure
Section 2 presents the models and the results: the main result described above, and
an analogous multiple-prior representation in the framework of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963). Section 3 studies the notions of indecisiveness and being more decisive in our
models. All the proofs are presented in Section 4.
2 Models and Results
2.1 Risk (von Neumann-Morgenstern Framework)
2.1.1 Preliminaries
Let X be a ﬁnite set of consequences (certain prizes). 6 Let Y = 4 (X) be the set of lot-
teries over X. Let Y be the set of non-empty closed sets in Y . The mixture (convex com-
bination) of two lotteries is deﬁned as follows: (αq + (1− α) r) (x) = αq (x)+(1− α) r (x)
(where α ∈ [0, 1], q, r ∈ Y and x ∈ X). Similarly, given A ∈ Y , let αq + (1− α)A denote
the set of lotteries that include all convex combinations of q with lottery r in A, with
weights α and 1− α respectively: (αq + (1− α)A) = {αq + (1− α)r|r ∈ A}.
The primitive of the model is a choice correspondence C over Y. 7 For each such set
A ∈ Y , C (A) is a non-empty subset of A. The interpretation of C is the following: when
a decision maker faces a choice from menu A, she selects one of the alternatives in C (A),
and any alternative in C (A) may be chosen. That is, the decision maker considers all the
elements in C (A), and only them, as choosable alternatives. The selection of a speciﬁc
element in C (A) is not explicitly modeled. When q ∈ C(A) we say that q is (sometimes)
chosen (or selected) from A; similarly, when q /∈ C(A) we say that q is not chosen from
A. Given A ∈ Y , conv (A) denotes the convex hull of A (the smallest convex set that
contains A).
The following three standard axioms (assumptions) are imposed on C:
A1 Non-triviality. ∃A ∈ Y and ∃q ∈ A, such that q /∈ C(A).
A2 Continuity. For any lottery q ∈ Y , the set {r ∈ Y |r ∈ C ({q, r})} is closed, and the
set {r ∈ Y | {r} = C ({q, r})} is open.
6 We deﬁne X to be ﬁnite for simplicity of presentation. Both models can be extended to a
compact metric space of outcomes (see, Evren, 2010; Gilboa et al., 2010).
7 We deﬁne C only on closed sets because in non-closed sets the Pareto frontier might be an
empty set. Our results remain the same if C is deﬁned only on ﬁnite (non-empty) sets.
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A3 Independence. Let q ∈ A ∈ Y , r ∈ Y and α ∈ (0, 1). q ∈ C (A) ⇔ αr + (1− α) q ∈
C (αr + (1− α)A).
Axioms A1-A3 are standard. Axiom A1 requires that C be non-trivial (there is a choice
set with at least one unchoosable alternative). Axiom A2 (continuity) is equivalent to the
requirement that for any lottery q ∈ A, the sets {r|r  q} and {r|r  q} are closed, where
 is the preference relation that is revealed from binary choices: r  q ⇔ r ∈ C ({q, r}) . 8
Assume that the decision maker is going to select lottery q in A, when she ﬁnds out that
there is probability α that she will be obliged to take lottery r. Axiom A3 (independence)
requires the decision maker to choose the mixture of q and r in the new choice problem
(the mixture of A and r).
2.1.2 Convex Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority (CARNI)
It is well known that a choice correspondence is consistent with (complete) preference
maximization if and only if it satisﬁes WARP:
WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) - Let A,B ∈ Y and q, r ∈ A ∩ B.
q ∈ C(A) and r ∈ C(B) implies q ∈ C(B).
That is, if q and r are elements in the intersection of two sets, q is chosen in the ﬁrst
set, and r is chosen in the second set, then both alternatives should be chosen in both
sets. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) show that Axioms A1-A3 and WARP are
equivalent to expected utility representation: There exists a unique vN-M utility function
u, such that the chosen lotteries are best according to u. That is, for every set A ∈ Y and
every lottery q ∈ A: q ∈ C(A)⇔ u (q) ≥ u (r) ∀r ∈ A.
With an eye to our relaxation of WARP, we formulate it slightly diﬀerently:
WARP' (equivalent formulation to WARP) - Let q ∈ A ∈ Y . If there exists r ∈ C(A)
and B ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (B) and r ∈ B, then q ∈ C(A).
WARP is appropriate when the psychological preferences of the decision maker are com-
plete. In such cases, if q is selected from a menu that includes r then it implies that q is
revealed to be as good as r. Thus if r is chosen from A so is q.
When the psychological preferences are incomplete, there is a diﬀerence between some-
thing being superior and it being non-inferior for a decision maker. Eliaz and Ok (2006)
propose the following axiom to deal with choice that is induced from incomplete prefer-
ences:
WARNI (Weak Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority) - Let q ∈ A ∈ Y . If for every
r ∈ C(A) there exists B ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (B) and r ∈ B, then q ∈ C(A).
According to Eliaz and Ok (2006)'s deﬁnition, element q is revealed not to be inferior
to r, if q is chosen from a set and r is an element in that set. WARNI requires that if
q is revealed not to be inferior to all of the alternatives chosen from A, then it must be
chosen from A as well. Following Eliaz and Ok (2006) one can show that axioms A1-A3
and WARNI are equivalent to the following multiple-utility representation: There exists a
8 Alternatively, A2 is equivalent to the requirement that sets {r|r  q} and {r|r ≺ q} are open,
where  is the revealed strict preference relation (r  q ⇔ {r} = C ({q, r}).
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convex and compact set U of vN-M utility functions (unique up to linear transformations),
such that for every A ∈ Y and every lottery q ∈ A: 9
q ∈ C(A)⇔ ∀r ∈ A, ∃ur ∈ U, s.t. ur (q) ≥ ur (r) . (1)
As discussed in the introduction, in some choice situations, it seems more appropriate to
require a convex variation of WARNI. This requirement is captured by CARNI:
A4 Convex Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority (CARNI). Let q ∈ A ∈ Y . If ∀r ∈
conv (C(A)) there exists B ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (B) and r ∈ conv (B), then q ∈ C(A).
We say that element q is revealed not to be inferior to r, if q is selected from a set and
r is a mixture of elements in that set. CARNI requires that if q is revealed not to be
inferior to all the mixtures of the elements chosen from A, then it must be chosen from
A as well. 10 The relationships between CARNI and related existing axioms are discussed
in Subsection 2.2.
2.1.3 Representation Theorem
The standard axioms A1-A3 (non-triviality, continuity, independence) and CARNI (A4)
yield a multiple-utility representation in which a lottery is chosen if and only if it is best
with respect to one of the utilities. Formally:
Theorem 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y. The following are equivalent:
(1) C satisﬁes axioms A1-A4.
(2) There exists a convex compact set U of of vN-M utility functions, such that:
(a) for every A ∈ Y and every lottery q ∈ A:
q ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U, s.t. ∀r ∈ A, u (q) ≥ u (r) . (2)
(b) There are two lotteries p, p ∈ Y such that ∀u ∈ U , u
(
p
)
< u (p).
Moreover, the set U is unique up to positive linear transformations. 11
2.1.4 Sketch of Proof
The formal proof of Theorem 1, like all other proofs in the paper, appears in Section 4. In
what follows we brieﬂy sketch the main parts of the proof, in order to explain the intuition
of the result.
Eliaz and Ok (2006) show that WARNI and the standard axioms yield a multiple-utility
representation in which an element is chosen if it can beat any other alternative in the
9 Eliaz and Ok (2006)'s representation is somewhat diﬀerent than (1) due to their dif-
ferent continuity requirements. Their representation is as follows: q ∈ C(A) ⇔ ∀r ∈
A, (∃ur ∈ U, s.t. ur (q) > ur (r) or ∀u ∈ U u (q) = u (r)).
10 CARNI could be stated as an if and only if property (see Lemma 3): q is chosen in A if and
only if it is revealed not to be inferior to all the mixtures of the elements chosen from A.
11 That is, if both U and V are convex compact sets that represent the same choice correspondence
then ∀u ∈ U, ∃v ∈ V such that u = a · v + b where a > 0 and b ∈ R.
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choice set for at least one vN-M utility (as described in (1)). Replacing WARNI by CARNI
yields a similar representation, only this time the chosen element has to beat any other
alternative in the convex hull of the choice set:
q ∈ C(A)⇔ ∀r ∈ conv (A) , ∃ur ∈ U, s.t. ur (q) ≥ ur (r) .
This representation is equivalent to:
q ∈ C(A)⇔ min
r∈conv(A)
max
u∈U
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0.
Since both the set of utilities and the convex hull of the menu are convex, and since all
the utilities in U are linear, we can now use the minimax theorem to reverse the order of
the minimization and maximization above and obtain that:
q ∈ C(A)⇔ max
u∈U
min
r∈conv(A)
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to:
q ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U s.t. ∀r ∈ conv(A), u (q) ≥ u (r) .
Since all the utilities in U are linear, one can replace conv (A) with A and obtain (2).
2.2 Relationships Between CARNI and Existing Axioms
For expositional purpose, we present in Figure 2 the relations between CARNI and existing
axioms in the literature. We hope that this presentation will be beneﬁcial to the reader
and will simplify the understanding of CARNI. However, note that the results in this
paper do not rely on these relations.
Figure 2. Logical Implications of CARNI and Related Axioms
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The axioms that are presented in Figure 2 are deﬁned as follows:
• Mixture Invariance (Seidenfeld et al., 2010, axiom 2b) - q ∈ C (A)⇒ q ∈ C (conv (A)):
If an element is chosen in a set, it is also chosen in the convex hull of the set. The in-
tuition of Mixture Invariance is that if the decision maker can implicitly use internal
randomization devices and she satisﬁes the reduction of compound lotteries, then a cho-
sen element should still be chosen when a mixture of existing alternatives is added to
the choice set.
• Sen's α (Sen, 1971; also called contraction property)- For any A,B ∈ Y , if q ∈ A ⊆ B
and q ∈ C (B), then q ∈ C (A): If an element is chosen in a set, it should also be chosen
in a subset.
• Sen's β (Sen, 1971) - For any A,B ∈ Y with A ⊆ B, if q, r ∈ C (A) and q ∈ C (B),
then r ∈ C (B): If two elements are chosen in a set, and one of them is also chosen in
a superset, then both of them should be chosen in the superset.
• Sen's γ (Sen, 1971) - Let M ⊆ Y be a collection of sets and let A be the union of all
these sets. If A ∈ Y and q ∈ C (B) for each B ∈ M , then q ∈ C (A): If an element is
chosen in each set of some class, it should also be chosen in the union of all these sets.
• Convex γ - Let M ⊆ Y be a collection of sets and let A be the union of all these sets.
If A ∈ Y , A is convex, and q ∈ C (B) for each B ∈ M , then q ∈ C (A): This axiom is
the same as Sen's γ except that it is restricted to cases where the union of the sets (A)
is convex. It is immediate to see that Sen's γ implies Convex γ.
• Aizerman property (Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981, property O; Chernoﬀ, 1954,
postulate 5*) - For any A,B ∈ Y , and for any q ∈ C (A), if C (B) ⊆ A ⊆ B, then
q ∈ C (B): A choosable element is still chosen after adding unchosen alternatives to the
menu.
The following observations are implied from Figure 2:
(1) There is no logical implication between CARNI and WARNI (or WARP). On the one
hand, CARNI requires non-inferiority against a larger set of alternatives as a neces-
sary condition for being chosen. On the other hand CARNI deﬁnes non-inferiority
in a weaker way (there is a larger collection of sets in which an element may be
revealed not to be inferior to another element). Example 1 demonstrates a choice
correspondence that satisﬁes CARNI and violates WARNI. Modifying the choice
in that example by having {bn, cn, q} = C ({bn, cn, q}), would give a choice corre-
spondence that satisﬁes WARNI and violates CARNI (given that q is inferior to
0.5bn+ 0.5cn).
(2) WARP together with Mixture Invariance implies CARNI.
(3) It is well known that WARP can be decomposed into two independent axioms: Sen's
α and Sen's β. CARNI (like WARNI) only satisﬁes Sen's α. As discussed in Eliaz and
Ok (2006, Remark 1) Sen's α has a strong normative appeal, while the normative
appeal of Sen's β is ambiguous.
(4) CARNI can be decomposed into four independent axioms: Sen's α, Convex γ (a
weakening of Sen's γ to convex sets), Aizerman Property and Mixture Invariance.
(5) It may be of independent interest to note that WARNI can be decomposed into three
well-known independent axioms: Sen's α, Sen's γ and Aizerman Property.
(6) It is well-known (Sen, 1971) that a choice correspondence is consistent with preference
maximization (also called binariness or normality) if and only if it satisﬁes both Sen's
α and Sen's γ. This implies that a choice correspondence which satisﬁes CARNI is
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in general inconsistent with preference maximization (unlike WARNI or WARP).
2.3 Uncertainty (Anscombe-Aumann Framework)
2.3.1 Model
In this model we follow the framework of Anscombe-Aumann (1963, as reformulated in
Fishburn, 1970). Similar to the ﬁrst model, X is a ﬁnite set of outcomes and Y = 4 (X)
is the set of lotteries. Let S be a ﬁnite set of states of nature, and, abusing notation,
let S = |S|. Let L = Y S be the set of all functions from states of nature to lotteries.
Such functions are referred to as acts. Endow this set with the product topology, where
the topology on Y is the relative topology inherited from [0, 1]X . Let L be the set of all
closed and non-empty sets in L. Abusing notation, for an act f ∈ L and a state s ∈ S,
we denote by f (s) the constant act that assigns the lottery f(s) to every state of nature.
Similarly for set A ∈ L and state s ∈ S, let A (s) denote the act-wise set of constant acts:
A (s) = {f (s) |f ∈ A}.
Mixtures (convex combinations) of acts are performed point-wise. In particular if f, g ∈ L
and α ∈ [0, 1], then (αf + (1− α)g) (s) = αf (s) + (1−α)g (s) for every s ∈ S. Similarly,
let (αf + (1− α)A) denote the set where each g ∈ A is replaced by αf + (1 − α)g:
(αf + (1− α)A) = {αf + (1− α)g|g ∈ A}. As in the former model, the primitive is a
choice correspondence C over L, which satisﬁes that for each A ∈ L, C (A) is a non-
empty subset of A.
The following ﬁve axioms are imposed on the choice correspondence:
B0 Monotonicity. Let f ∈ A ∈ L and g ∈ B ∈ L. If ∀s ∈ S, f(s) ∈ C (f (s) , g (s)) then:
(i) g ∈ C (B)⇒f ∈ C (B ∪ {f}), and (ii) C (A) ⊆ C (A ∪ {g}).
B1 Non-triviality. There is an act f ∈ A ∈ L such that f 6∈ C(A).
B2 Continuity. For any act f ∈ L, the set {g ∈ L|g ∈ C ({f, g})} is closed, and the set
{g ∈ L| {g} = C ({f, g})} is open.
B3 Independence. Let f ∈ A ∈ L, h ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1). f ∈ C (A) ⇐⇒ αh+ (1− α) f ∈
C (αh+ (1− α)A).
B4 Convex Axiom of Revealed Non-Inferiority (CARNI). Let f ∈ A ∈ L. If ∀g ∈
conv (C(A)) there exists B ∈ Y such that f ∈ C (B) and g ∈ conv (B), then f ∈ C(A).
We say that act f (weakly) dominates act g if for every state of nature s ∈ S f (s) ∈
C ({f (s) , g (s)}). That is, for every state of nature s, if the decision maker knows s, act
f is chosen in the pair {f, g}. Thus, f is better than g in all states of nature. Axiom B0
(monotonicity) requires that if f dominates g, then: (i) f is chosen whenever it is added
to a set where g was a choosable alternative, and (ii) any alternative that is chosen in a
set that includes f is also chosen after adding g to this set. Axioms B1-B4 are analogous
to axioms A1-A4, which were discussed in the ﬁrst model.
Axioms B0-B3 and WARP 12 are equivalent to the subjective expected utility representa-
tion (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963; see also Savage, 1954): There exists a unique vN-M
utility function u, and a unique probability distribution p over S (prior), such that for
12 In the Anscombe-Aumann framework WARP is formulated as follows: Let A,B ∈ L and
f, g ∈ A ∩B. f ∈ C(A) and g ∈ C(B) implies f ∈ C(B).
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every A ∈ L and every act f ∈ A: f ∈ C(A)⇐⇒ Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A.
Axioms B0-B3 and WARNI 13 are equivalent to the following representation: There exists
a unique non-degenerate vN-M utility function u, and a unique closed and convex set
P ⊆ 4 (S) of priors, such that for every A ∈ L and every act f ∈ A:
f ∈ C(A)⇐⇒ ∀g ∈ A, ∃pg ∈ P s.t. Epg (u (f)) ≥ Epg (u (g)) . (3)
This representation is equivalent to the binary choice correspondence that is induced from
Knightian preferences (Bewley, 2002) or from justiﬁable preferences (Lehrer and Teper,
2011).
2.3.2 Representation Theorem
The standard axioms B0-B3 (monotonicity, non-triviality, continuity, independence) and
CARNI (B4) yield a multiple-prior representation in which an act is chosen if and only if
it is best with respect to one of the priors. Formally:
Theorem 2 Let C be a choice correspondence over L. The following are equivalent:
(1) C satisﬁes axioms B0-B4.
(2) There exists a non-constant vN-M utility function u, and a closed and convex set
P ⊆ 4 (S) of probability distributions over S (priors), such that for every set A ∈ L
and every act f ∈ A:
f ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃p ∈ P s.t. ∀g ∈ A, Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) . (4)
Moreover, P is unique and u is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Remark 1 As in the previous model, the extra convexity of CARNI allows us to change
the order of the quantiﬁers in the representation. In particular, in (3), each comparison
of a chosen act f with some act g ∈ A may be based on a diﬀerent prior pg ∈ P , while in
(4), all comparisons are based on the same prior p ∈ P .
3 Psychological Preferences and Indecisiveness
Incomplete preferences allows a decision maker to exhibit indecisiveness. In this section
we characterize the notions of indecisiveness and being more decisive in our models. This
characterization may be of independent interest, as it can also be applied to other models
of incomplete preferences. (e.g., Bewley, 2002; Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok, 2004; and Eliaz
and Ok, 2006).
13 In the Anscombe-Aumann framework WARNI is formulated as follows: Let f ∈ A ∈ L.
f ∈ C (A) if and only if for every g ∈ C (A) there exists B ∈ L such that f ∈ C (B) and g ∈ B.
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3.1 Psychological Preferences and Indecisiveness
The decision maker's revealed psychological preference relation ∗ is deﬁned for each
q, r ∈ Y as follows: 14
q ∗ r⇔
∀A ∈ Y (I) r ∈ C (A ∪ {r})⇒ q ∈ C (A ∪ {q})
(II) ∀p ∈ A : p ∈ C (A ∪ {q})⇒ p ∈ C (A ∪ {r})
 . (5)
Part (I) compares the set of menus in which each alternative is chosen. It requires that
if r is chosen when it is added to menu A, then q must also be chosen when it is added
to the same menu. Part (II) compares the choices of other alternatives when q or r are
available. It requires that if an element is selected when q is added to menu A, then
it should also be chosen when r is added to the same menu. Deﬁne q I r if part (I)
holds (i.e, q I r⇔(∀A ∈ Y , r ∈ C (A ∪ {r})⇒ q ∈ C (A ∪ {q}))) and deﬁne q II r if
part (II) holds (i.e., q II r ⇔ (∀A ∈ Y , ∀p ∈ A : p ∈ C (A ∪ {q})⇒ p ∈ C (A ∪ {r}))).
Observe that all these relations (q ∗ r, q I r, q II r) are transitive.
Deﬁne a decision maker to be indiﬀerent between q and r, and denote it by q ∼∗ r, if
q ∗ r and r ∗ q. Deﬁne a decision maker to be indecisive between q and r, and denote
it by q ./∗ r, if ¬q ∗ r and ¬r ∗ q. 15 Deﬁne a decision maker to have incomplete
(complete) preferences if the relation ∗ is incomplete (complete).
Bernheim and Rangel (2009) deﬁne revealed psychological preference relation (denoted
by R′ in their paper) as follows:
q BR r ⇔ (∀A ∈ Y with q, r ∈ A : r ∈ C (A)⇒ q ∈ C (A)) .
That is, q is revealed better than r a` la Bernheim and Rangel (2009) if whenever both
elements are available and r is selected, so is q. As noted by Bernheim and Rangel BR is
not necessarily transitive. 16 The relation I is a natural transitive strengthening of BR
(q I r ⇒ q BR r). The following example demonstrates why Part (II) is also required
when evaluating the revealed psychological preferences.
Example 2 Consider the following choice correspondence C over ﬁnite set X = {x, y, z}:
C (X) = {x, y}, C ({x, y}) = {x, y}, C ({x, z}) = {x}, and C ({y, z}) = {y, z}. Both rela-
tions I and BR imply that the decision maker is indiﬀerent between x and y. However,
the fact that z is selected from {y, z} but not from {x, z}, indicates that the decision maker
is not indiﬀerent between x and y: she selects z when y is available, but she does not choose
z when x is available.
We conclude by deﬁning the notion of being more decisive. Let Alice and Bob be two
14 For brevity, we state our deﬁnitions only in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, but
they apply very similarly also in the Anscombe-Aumann framework.
15 Indecisiveness is closely related to Eliaz and Ok (2006)'s notion of incomparability.
16 Consider, for example, the following choice correspondence C over ﬁnite set X = {x, y, z}:
C (X) = {x, y} , C ({x, y}) = {x, y} , C ({x, z}) = {x} , andC ({y, z}) = {z} . In this case, y BR
x BR z but y 6BR z.
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decision makers with respective indecisiveness relations ./∗A and ./
∗
B. Alice is more deci-
sive than Bob if q ./∗A r ⇒ q ./∗B r. That is, whenever Alice is indecisive between two
alternatives, so is Bob.
Observe that when Bob prefers q over r (q B r), Alice is required to have a preference
between the two alternatives, but her preference may either be q A r or r A q, and this
may depend on q and r. Two special cases of being more decisive are the extreme cases
of full consistency and full inconsistency. Alice is fully consistent (fully inconsistent) with
Bob if for each q, r ∈ Y : q B r implies that q A r (r A q).
Remark 2 If one assumes that there is a best element in X (∃xb ∈ X such that xb ∈ A
⇒{xb} = C (A)), then all of the results of the following subsections hold if one does either
of the following two changes (or both): (a) one replaces CARNI with WARNI; and (b)
one replaces ∗ with I or BR.
3.2 Multiple-Utility Characterization
Intuitively, a decision maker with a multiple-utility representation prefers q over r if all his
utilities assign q a better value. The following proposition shows the equivalence between
this deﬁnition and the choice-derived deﬁnition given in the previous subsection.
Proposition 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4.
Let U be the multiple-utility representation. Then for each q, r ∈ Y : q ∗ r ⇔q II r
⇔∀u ∈ U, u (q) ≥ u (r).
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 characterizes indecisiveness and indiﬀerence in
terms of the representation.
Corollary 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4. Let
U be the multiple-utility representation. Then for each q, r ∈ Y :
(1) r ∼∗ q ⇔∀u ∈ U, u (r) = u (q).
(2) r ./∗ q ⇔∃u1, u2 ∈ U, u1 (r) > u1 (q) and u2 (r) < u2 (q).
Proposition 1 shows that ∗ has a multiple-utility representation. It is well known that
such a preference relation is complete if and only if its set of utilities is a singleton (up to
positive linear transformations). Formally (proof is omitted):
Lemma 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4. Let U
be the respective multiple-utility representation. Then the indecisiveness relation is empty
if and only if U is a singleton (up to positive linear transformations: every u1, u2 ∈ U
satisfy u1 = a · u2 + b for some a > 0 and b ∈ R).
The following proposition shows that Alice is more decisive than Bob if either of the
following conditions hold: 1) Alice has a single utility, or 2) Alice's set of utilities is
included in Bob's set of utilities., or 3) Alice's set of utilities is included in Bob's set of
opposite utilities.
Proposition 2 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with respective choice corre-
spondences (CA, CB) over Y that satisfy axioms A1-A4 with respective multiple-utility
representations (UA, UB). Then Alice is more decisive than Bob if and only if at least one
of the following holds:
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(1) UA is a singleton (up to positive linear transformations).
(2) UA ⊆ UB (up to positive linear transformations: for each uA ∈ UA there exist uB ∈
UB, a > 0, and b ∈ R such that uB = a · uA + b)
(3) UA ⊆ −UB (up to positive linear transformations).
An immediate corollary of Proposition 2 is the following: if Alice has incomplete pref-
erences and she is more decisive than Bob, then she is either fully-consistent or fully-
inconsistent with him.
Corollary 2 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with choice correspondences that
satisfy axioms A1-A4. Assume that Alice has incomplete preferences and that she is more
decisive than Bob. Then Alice is either fully-consistent or fully-inconsistent with Bob.
3.3 Multiple-Prior Characterization
The following proposition shows that a decision maker with a multiple-prior representation
prefers act f over g if all her priors assign f a better value.
Proposition 3 Let C be a choice correspondence over L that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4. Let
u be the utility and P the set of priors in the multiple-prior representation. Then for each
f, g ∈ L: f ∗ g ⇔f II g⇔∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) .
An immediate corollary of Proposition 3 characterizes indecisiveness and indiﬀerence in
terms of the representation.
Corollary 3 Let C be a choice correspondence over L that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4. Let u
be the respective utility and P the respective set of priors in the representation. Then for
each f, g ∈ L:
(1) f ∼∗ g ⇔∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) = Ep (u (g)).
(2) f ./∗ g ⇔∃p1, p2 ∈ P, Ep1 (u (f)) > Ep1 (u (g)) and Ep2 (u (f)) < Ep2 (u (g)).
The following lemma shows that a decision maker with a multiple-prior representation
has complete preferences if and only if her set of priors is a singleton.
Lemma 2 Let C be a choice correspondence over L that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4. Let P
be the set of priors in the multiple-prior representation. Then the indecisiveness relation
./∗ is empty if and only if P is a singleton.
The following proposition shows that Alice is more decisive than Bob if either of the
following conditions hold: 1) Alice has a single prior, or 2) Alice's set of priors is included
in Bob's set of priors, and in addition Alice's utility is equal to Bob's utility or exactly
the opposite of Bob's utility.
Proposition 4 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with respective choice cor-
respondences (CA, CB) over L that satisfy axioms B0-B4 with respective multiple-prior
representations ((uA, PA) , (uB, PB)). Then Alice is more decisive than Bob if and only if
at least one of the following holds:
(1) PA is a singleton.
(2) PA ⊆ PB and uA = uB (up to positive linear transformations).
(3) PA ⊆ PB and uA = −uB (up to positive linear transformations).
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An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 is that if Alice has incomplete preferences and
she is more decisive than Bob, then she is either fully-consistent or fully-inconsistent with
him.
Corollary 4 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with choice correspondences that
satisfy axioms B0-B4. Assume that Alice has incomplete preferences and that she is more
decisive than Bob. Then Alice is either fully-consistent or fully-inconsistent with Bob.
4 Proofs
4.1 Equivalent Formulation of CARNI
The following lemma, which will be useful in later proofs, shows that CARNI can be
stated also as an if and only if statement:
Lemma 3 The following properties are equivalent:
(1) ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br) ⇒ q ∈ C(A).
(2) ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br) ⇔ q ∈ C(A).
PROOF. The equivalence holds due to the observation that q ∈ C(A) implies that
∀r ∈ conv (C(A)), ∃Br = A such that q ∈ C (Br) = C (A) and r ∈ conv (C(A)) ⊆
conv (A) = conv (Br). 
4.2 Logical Implications of CARNI and Related Axioms
In this subsection we prove the logical implications of CARNI and related axioms which
were presented in Subsection 2.2. The results are not used elsewhere in the paper (except
the fact that CARNI implies Sen's α).
The ﬁrst lemma shows that given WARP, Independence implies Mixture Invariance.
Lemma 4 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes WARP and Independence. Then
C satisﬁes Mixture Invariance: q ∈ C (A) ⇒ q ∈ C (conv (A)).
PROOF. WARP implies that C is consistent with preference maximization of transi-
tive and complete preference relation . Let q ∈ C (A). Assume to the contrary that
q 6∈ C (conv (A)). Let r ∈ C (conv (A)). Preference maximization implies that r ∈
C (conv (A)) \A and that r  t for each t ∈ A (because r  q and q  t for each t ∈ A).
Thus there exist t ∈ A and s ∈ conv (A) such that r = α · s+ (1− α) t where 0 < α < 1.
Independence implies: r  t ⇒s  t⇒s  r and this contradicts r ∈ C (conv (A)).
The next lemma shows that WARNI can be decomposed into the following three (inde-
pendent) axioms: Sen's α, Sen's γ, and Aizerman Property.
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Lemma 5 Let C be a choice correspondence. Then C satisﬁes WARNI if and only if it
satisﬁes the following 3 axioms: Sen's α, Sen's γ, and Aizerman Property .
PROOF. WARNI ⇒ Sen's α: Proved in Eliaz and Ok (2006).
WARNI ⇒ Sen's γ: Let M ⊆ Y be a collection of sets and let A be the union of all these
sets. Assume that A ∈ Y , and q ∈ C (B) for each B ∈ M . Observe that ∀r ∈ C(A) ⊆ A,
∃Br ∈M ⊆ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ Br. By WARNI this implies that q ∈ C (A).
WARNI ⇒ Aizerman Property: Let A,B ∈ Y satisfying C (B) ⊆ A ⊆ B. Let q ∈ C (A).
Assume to the contrary that q /∈ C (B). By WARNI there exists r ∈ C (B) ⊆ A such that
q is never chosen when r is present in the choice set. This implies q /∈ C (A) and we get
a contradiction.
Sen's α + Sen's γ + Aizerman Property ⇒ WARNI: Let A ∈ Y and q ∈ A. Assume that
∀r ∈ C(A), ∃Br ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ Br. By Sen's α, q ∈ C ({q, r}) for
each r ∈ C (A). Sen's γ implies that q ∈ C (C (A) ∪ {q}). Finally, by Aizerman Property,
q ∈ C (A).
The next lemma shows that CARNI can be decomposed into the following four (indepen-
dent) axioms: Sen's α, Convex γ, Aizerman Property and Mixture Invariance.
Lemma 6 Let C be a choice correspondence. Then C satisﬁes CARNI if and only if
C satisﬁes the following 4 axioms: Sen's α, Convex γ, Aizerman Property, and Mixture
Invariance.
PROOF. CARNI ⇒ Sen's α: Let A,B ⊆ Y with A ⊆ B and q ∈ C (B). Assume to
the contrary that and q /∈ C (A). Then by CARNI there is r ∈ conv (C(A)) such that
for every Br ∈ Y with r ∈ conv (Br) ⇒q /∈ C (Br). Observe that r ∈ conv (C(A)) ⊆
conv (A) ⊆ conv (B) and this implies that q /∈ C (B) and this leads to a contradiction.
CARNI ⇒ Convex γ: Let M ⊆ Y be a collection of sets and let A be the union of all
these sets. Assume that A ∈ Y , A is convex, and q ∈ C (B) for each B ∈ M . Observe
that ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ⊆ conv (A) = A, ∃Br ∈ M ⊆ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and
r ∈ Br ⊆ conv (Br). By CARNI this implies that q ∈ C (A).
CARNI ⇒ Aizerman Property: Let A,B ∈ Y satisfying C (B) ⊆ A ⊆ B. Let q ∈ C (A).
Assume to the contrary that q /∈ C (B). By CARNI there exists r ∈ conv (C (B)) ⊆
conv (A) such that q is never chosen when r is present in the convex hull of the choice
set. This implies q /∈ C (A) and we get a contradiction.
CARNI ⇒ Mixture Invariance: Let A ∈ Y and q ∈ C (A). By CARNI (and Lemma 3)
q ∈ C (A) implies that ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br).
This implies (again by CARNI) that q ∈ C (conv (A)).
Sen's α + Convex γ + Aizerman Property + Mixture Invariance ⇒ CARNI: Let A ∈
Y and q ∈ A. Assume that ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y such that q ∈ C (Br) and
r ∈ conv (Br). By Mixture Invariance q ∈ C (conv (Br)). Sen's α implies that q ∈
C (conv ({q, r})) for each r ∈ conv (C(A)). By Convex γ, q ∈ C (conv (C (A) ∪ {q})).
Sen's α implies that q ∈ C (C (A) ∪ {q}). Finally, by Aizerman Property, q ∈ C (A).
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It is well known that WARP implies Sen's α, Sen's γ ⇒Convex γ, and Aizerman Property
(see Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981). Thus Lemma 6 implies that WARP + Mixture
Invariance ⇒ CARNI.
4.3 Risk (von Neumann-Morgenstern framework)
In this subsection we prove Theorem 1. We begin by showing that the multiple-utility
representation implies axioms A1-A4. Let U be a compact and convex set of linear (vN-M)
utilities such that: 1) ∀A ∈ Y and q ∈ A: q ∈ C(A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U, s.t.∀r ∈ A, u (q) ≥ u (r),
and 2) there are two lotteries p, p ∈ Y such that ∀u ∈ U , u
(
p
)
< u (p). Axiom A1 (non-
triviality) holds because {p} = C
({
p, p
})
. Axioms A2 (continuity) and A3 (independence)
are immediate from the compactness of U and the linearity of each u ∈ U . Let q ∈ A ∈ Y .
In order to prove axiom A4 we have to show that q ∈ C (A) if ∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y
such that q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br). This is done as follows:
∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y s.t. q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br)
⇒∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃ur ∈ U ur (q) ≥ ur (r) (6)
⇒∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) max
u∈U
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0
⇒ min
r∈conv(C(A))
max
u∈U
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0
⇒max
u∈U
min
r∈conv(C(A))
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0 (7)
⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ conv(C (A)), u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r)
⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ C(A), u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r) (8)
⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ A, u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r) (9)
⇒ q ∈ C(A) (10)
Where (6) is implied by the representation and the linearity of the utilities; (7) is due to
the minimax theorem (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) using the linearity of the
utilities, and the convexity and compactness of U and conv (C (A)); and (10) is implied
by the representation. We are left with showing that (9) holds. Assume to the contrary
that (9) does not hold. Let t ∈ A\C (A) s.t. u0 (t) > u0 (q). Let t′ be an element in A
that maximizes u0. By (8) t
′ must be in A\C (A), while the representation implies that t′
must be in C (A) (contradiction).
We now show that axioms A1-A4 imply the multiple-utility representation. Let  denote
the revealed (irreﬂexive) strict preference relation that is induced from C: q  r ⇔ {q} =
C ({q, r}) (q 6= r).
The following lemma shows that  satisﬁes transitivity, non-triviality, continuity and
independence.
Lemma 7 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4, and let  be
the revealed strict preference. Then  satisﬁes the following properties:
C1 Non-triviality - There are q, r ∈ Y such that q  r.
C2 Continuity - For each q ∈ Y the sets {q|q  r} and {q|q ≺ r} are open.
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C3 Independence - For any p, q, r ∈ Y and any α ∈ (0, 1), q  r ⇔ αp + (1− α) q 
αp+ (1− α) r
C4 Transitivity - For any p, q, r ∈ Y , p  q and q  r implies that p  r.
PROOF. Axiom C1 is implied by axiom A1 (non-triviality of C) together with CARNI:
by Axiom A1 there exists q ∈ A\C (A); due to CARNI there exists r ∈ conv (C(A)) such
that q is never chosen when r is present in the convex hull of the choice set; in particular,
q /∈ C ({q, r}). Axioms C2-C3 are immediately implied from the analogous properties of C
(A2-A3). C4 (transitivity) is proved as follows. Let p  q and q  r. CARNI implies that:
{q} = C ({q, r})⇒r /∈ C ({p, q, r}), and {p} = C ({p, q})⇒q /∈ C ({p, q, r}).So it must be
that {p} = C ({p, q, r}). Assume to the contrary that r ∈ C ({p, r}). CARNI implies that
r ∈ C ({p, q, r}) and we get a contradiction.  (Lemma 7)
The following proposition (Theorem 1 in Evren, 2010) shows that  has a unique multiple-
utility representation.
Proposition 5 (Evren, 2010, Theorem 1) Let  be a strict binary relation over Y . The
following are equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes axioms C1-C4 (transitivity, non-triviality, continuity and independence).
(2) There exists a nonempty convex compact set U of linear (vN-M) utility functions,
such that:
(a) for every two lotteries q, r ∈ Y , q  r ⇔ ∀u ∈ U, u (q) > u (r).
(b) There are two outcomes q, q ∈ Y such that ∀u ∈ U , u
(
q
)
< u (q).
Moreover (Evren, 2010, Theorem 2),U is unique up to positive linear transformations.
That is if both U and V are convex compact sets that represent the same choice corre-
spondence then ∀u ∈ U, ∃v ∈ V such that u = a · v + b where a > 0 and b ∈ R.
We use Proposition 5 to ﬁnish Theorem 1's proof, by showing that axioms A1-A4 imply
the multiple-prior representation. Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes these
axioms, and let  be the revealed strict preference. Let U be the unique (up to linear
transformations) convex and compact set of utilities of Prop. 5. We have to show for each
q ∈ A ∈ Y , q ∈ C (A)⇔ ∃u ∈ U, s.t. u (q) ≥ u (r) ∀r ∈ A. This is done as follows:
q ∈ C (A)⇐⇒∀r ∈ conv (C(A)) ∃Br ∈ Y s.t. q ∈ C (Br) and r ∈ conv (Br) (11)
⇐⇒¬∃r ∈ conv(C (A)) s.t. r  q (12)
⇐⇒∀r ∈ conv(C (A)) ∃ur ∈ U such thatur (q) ≥ ur (r) (13)
⇐⇒ min
r∈conv(C(A))
max
u∈U
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒max
u∈U
min
r∈conv(C(A))
(u (q)− u (r)) ≥ 0 (14)
⇐⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ conv(C (A)), u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r) (15)
⇐⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ C (A) , u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r) (16)
⇐⇒∃u0 ∈ U s.t.∀r ∈ A, u0 (q) ≥ u0 (r) (17)
Where (11) is implied by CARNI and Lemma 3; (12) is due to the deﬁnition of  and
CARNI; (13) is implied by Proposition 5; (14) is due to the minimax theorem using the
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convexity and compactness of the sets U and conv (C (A)) and the linearity of each utility
u ∈ U ; and (16) is implied by the linearity of u. We are left with showing that (17) holds.
Assume to the contrary that (17) does not hold. Let t ∈ A\C (A) s.t. u0 (t) > u0 (q). Let
t′ be an element in A that maximizes u0. Observe that t′ must be in A\C (A) due to (15).
By Proposition 5 ¬∃r ∈ A s.t. r  t′. By CARNI, t′ must be chosen in A (contradiction).
Uniqueness (up to positive linear transformations) follows from the uniqueness of Propo-
sition 5 as follows. Let C be a choice correspondence and let  be its revealed strict
preference. Due to Proposition 5  has a unique multiple-utility representation U . Let
U ′ be a utility set that also represents C. Let ′ be the unique strict preference that is
represented by U ′ (due to Proposition 5). Assume to the contrary that U and U ′ are not
equivalent under positive linear transformations. Then there are q, r ∈ Y such that either:
(q  r and q 6′ r) or (q ′ r and q 6 r). Both cases imply a contradiction with respect
to the choice from {q, r}.  (Theorem 1)
4.4 Uncertainty (Anscombe-Aumann Framework)
In this subsection we prove Theorem 2. We begin by showing that the multiple-prior
representation implies axioms B0-B4. Let u be a non-constant linear (vN-M) utility and
let P be a set of priors such that for every A ∈ L and every act f ∈ A: f ∈ C(A) ⇔
∃p ∈ P s.t. ∀g ∈ A, Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) . Axiom B0 (monotonicity) holds because
∀s ∈ S f (s) ∈ C (f (s) , g (s)) implies Ep (f) ≥ Ep (g) for every p ∈ 4 (S), which implies
(i) and (ii) in B0. Axiom B1 (non-triviality) holds because of the non triviality of u.
Axioms B2 (continuity) and B3 (independence) are immediate from the linearity of u and
the closedness of P . Axiom B4 (CARNI) is implied by the representation due to the same
argument that was given in the previous subsection for axiom A4.
We now show that axioms B0-B4 imply the multiple-prior representation. Let  denote
the revealed (weak) preference relation that is induced from C: q  r ⇔ q ∈ C ({q, r}),
and let  be its strict part (which is deﬁned as in the previous subsection: q  r ⇔ {q} =
C ({q, r}). The following proposition shows that  satisﬁes unambiguous transitivity,
non-triviality, continuity, independence, completeness and favorable mixing.
Proposition 6 Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4, and let 
be the revealed preference relation . Then  satisﬁes the following properties:
D0 Unambiguous Transitivity. Let f, g, h ∈ L such that ∀s ∈ S f(s)  g(s). Then, (i)
h  f ⇒h  g, and (ii) g  h ⇒f  h.
D1 Non-triviality. There are acts f, g ∈ L s.t. f  g.
D2 Continuity. For any f ∈ L, the sets {g|g  f} and {g|g  f} are closed.
D3 Independence. Let f, g ∈ L. f  g if and only if αh+ (1− α) f  αh+ (1− α) g for
every h ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1).
D4 Completeness and reﬂexivity. For any f, g ∈ L, f  g or g  f , and f ∼ f .
D5 Favorable mixing. For every f, g, h ∈ L and α ∈ (0, 1), if g  f and αf + (1− α)h 
g, then λf + (1− λ)h  g, for every 0 < λ ≤ α .
PROOF. Axiom D0 is implied by axiom B0 (monotonicity) and by Sen's α (Lemma 6).
Axiom D1 is implied by axiom B1 (non triviality of C) and CARNI. Axioms D2-D3 are
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implied by the analogous properties B2-B3. Axiom D4 follows from the deﬁnition of  as a
revealed preference relation. Axiom D5 is proved as follows. Let h′ = λf+(1− λ)h where
0 < λ ≤ α. Assume to the contrary that h′ ≺ g. Observe that there exists β ∈ (0, 1)
such that αf + (1− α)h = βf + (1− β)h′. Independence (D3) implies that h′ ≺ g
⇒βg + (1− β)h′ ≺ βg + (1− β) g = g, and f ≺ g ⇒βf + (1− β)h′ ≺ βg + (1− β)h′ .
The transitivity of the strict preference  (which is proved as in the previous subsection)
implies that αf + (1− α)h = βf + (1− β)h′ ≺ g, which contradicts the fact that αf +
(1− α)h  g.
The following proposition (Lehrer and Teper, 2011, Theorem 1) shows that  has a unique
multiple-prior representation.
Proposition 7 (Lehrer and Teper, 2011, Theorem 1). Let  be a binary relation over
L. The following are equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes axioms D0-D5.
(2) There exists a non-degenerate vN-M utility u, and a convex closed set P of priors
over the states of nature, such that for every two acts f, g ∈ L: f  g ⇔ ∃p ∈
P with Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)).
Moreover, P is unique and u is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Observe that Proposition 7 immediately implies that the strict relation  has Knightian
representation (Bewely, 2002): f  g ⇔ ∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) > Ep (u (g)). We use Proposi-
tion 7 to ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 2, by showing that axioms B0-B4 imply the multiple-
prior representation. Let C be a choice correspondence that satisﬁes these axioms, and let
 be the revealed strict preference. Let u be the unique utility (up to linear transforma-
tions), and let P be the unique convex and closed set of priors of Proposition 7. We have
to show, for each f ∈ A ∈ L, f ∈ C (A) ⇔ ∃p ∈ P, s.t. Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) ∀g ∈ A.
This is done as follows:
f ∈ C (A)⇐⇒¬∃g ∈ conv(C (A)) s.t. g  f (18)
⇐⇒∀g ∈ conv(C (A)) ∃p ∈ P s.t. Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)) (19)
⇐⇒ min
g∈conv(C(A))
max
p∈P
Ep (u (f)− u (g)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒max
p∈P
min
g∈conv(C(A))
Ep (u (f)− u (g)) ≥ 0 (20)
⇐⇒∃p0 ∈ P s.t.∀g ∈ conv(C (A)), Ep0 (u (f)) ≥ Ep0 (u (g))
⇐⇒∃p0 ∈ P s.t.∀g ∈ C (A) , Ep0 (u (f)) ≥ Ep0 (u (g)) (21)
⇐⇒∃p0 ∈ P s.t.∀g ∈ A, Ep0 (u (f)) ≥ Ep0 (u (g)) (22)
Where (18) is implied by CARNI, Lemma 3 and the deﬁnition of ; (19) is due to
Proposition 7, (20) is implied by the minimax theorem using the convexity and closedness
of the sets P and conv (A) and the linearity of each u ∈ U , (21) is due to the linearity
of u; and (22) is proved in the same way that (17) is proved in the previous subsection.
The uniqueness of P and u (up to linear transformations) is implied by the uniqueness in
Proposition 7.  (Theorem 2).
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4.5 Indecisiveness and indiﬀerence
In this section we prove the results of Section 3.
4.5.1 Multiple-Utility Characterization
We begin by proving Proposition 1, which characterizes ∗ in terms of the representation:
Proposition 1 Let C be a choice correspondence over Y that satisﬁes axioms A1-A4.
Let U be the multiple-utility representation. Then for each q, r ∈ Y : q ∗ r ⇔q II r
⇔∀u ∈ U, u (q) ≥ u (r).
PROOF. It is immediate that q ∗ r⇒q II r and that ∀u ∈ U, u (q) ≥ u (r)⇒ q ∗ r.
We now show that q II r ⇒∀u ∈ U, u (q) ≥ u (r). Assume to the contrary that there
exists u0 ∈ U such that u0 (r) > u0 (q). We have to show that there exist A ∈ Y and
p ∈ A, such that p ∈ C (A ∪ {q}) and p 6∈ C (A ∪ {r}). Let p, p ∈ Y be alternatives such
that u
(
p
)
< u (p) for every utility u ∈ U . For each  > 0, let p = p+ (0.5− ) q + 0.5r,
and let A = {p, (2p+ (1− 2) q)}. For suﬃciently small , u0 (p) > u0 (q) and u0 (p) >
u0 (2p+ (1− 2) q). This implies that p ∈ C (A ∪ {q}). In addition, for every  > 0 and
every u ∈ U , u (p) < u (p+ (0.5− ) q + 0.5r) = 0.5u (2p+ (1− 2) q) + 0.5u (r). This
implies that p /∈ C (A ∪ {r}).
Finally, we prove Proposition 2, which characterizes when Alice is more decisive than Bob
in terms of multiple-utility representation. It shows that Alice is more decisive if: 1) Alice
has a single utility, or 2) Alice's set of utilities is included in Bob's set of utilities., or 3)
Alice's set of utilities is included in Bob's set of opposite utilities.
Proposition 2 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with respective choice corre-
spondences (CA, CB) over Y that satisfy axioms A1-A4 with respect to multiple-utility
representations (UA, UB). Then Alice is more decisive than Bob if and only if at least
one of the following holds:
(1) UA is a singleton (up to positive linear transformations).
(2) UA ⊆ UB (up to positive linear transformations).
(3) UA ⊆ −UB (up to positive linear transformations).
PROOF. The `if' part is straightforward. The `only if' part is proved as follows. Assume
that Alice is more decisive than Bob and that UA is not a singleton. Let pB, pB ∈ Y be
elements such that uB (pB) > uB
(
p
B
)
for each uB ∈ UB, and let pA, pA ∈ Y be elements
such that uA (pA) > uA
(
p
A
)
for each uA ∈ UA. Let q, r ∈ Y be elements such that Alice
is indecisive between them (q ./∗A r, such elements exist due to Lemma 1).
We begin by showing that uA (pB) 6= uA
(
p
B
)
for every uA ∈ UA. If uA (pB) = uA
(
p
B
)
for
every uA ∈ UA. Then by Corollary 1, for suﬃciently small  > 0, Bob is decisive between
(1− ) pB + q and (1− ) pB + r, while Alice is indecisive between these alternatives.
If there exist u1, u2 ∈ UA such that u1 (pB) = u1
(
p
B
)
and u2 (pB) > u2
(
p
B
)
(u2 (pB) <
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u2
(
p
B
)
), then by using Corollary 1, for suﬃciently small  > 0, Bob is decisive between
(1− ) pB+pA and (1− ) pB+pA (between (1− ) pB+pA and (1− ) pB+pA), while
Alice is indecisive between these alternatives. The convexity of UA then implies that either
uA (pB) > uA
(
p
B
)
for every uA ∈ UA or uA (pB) < uA
(
p
B
)
for every uA ∈ UA.
Assume ﬁrst that uA (pB) > uA
(
p
B
)
for every uA ∈ UA. Normalize every utility u in
UA ∪ UB to satisfy u (pB) = 1 and u
(
p
B
)
= 0. Assume to the contrary that there exists
uA ∈ UA\UB. By a standard separation theorem (using the convexity and the compactness
of UB) there exist q, r ∈ Y such that α = uA (r) − uA (q) > uB (r) − uB (q) for each
uB ∈ UB. 17 Let β = maxuB∈UB (uB (r)− uB (q)). Assume ﬁrst that there is u′A ∈ UA such
that γ = u′A (r) − u′A (q) 6= α. By the convexity of UA one can assume that β < γ. This
implies that Alice is indecisive between the following lotteries:
1
1 + α+γ
2
r +
( α+γ
2
1 + α+γ
2
)
p
B
and
1
1 + α+γ
2
q +
( α+γ
2
1 + α+γ
2
)
pB
(because if γ > α then the ﬁrst lottery is better according to u′A and the second lottery is
better according to uA, and if γ < α the opposite holds), while Bob is decisive (the second
lottery is better according to all of Bob's utilities) - a contradiction. So we are left with the
case that u′A (r)− u′A (q) = α for every u′A ∈ UA. As UA is not a singleton, there is p ∈ Y
and u1A, u
2
A ∈ UA such that u1A (p) > u2A (p). For suﬃciently small δ > 0, r′ = (1− δ) r+δp
and q′ = (1− δ) q + δp satisfy: 1) u1A (r′) − u1A (q′) , u2A (r′) − u2A (q′) > uB (r′) − uB (q′)
for each uB ∈ UB, 2) u2A (r′)− u2A (q′) 6= u1A (r′)− u1A (q′). By the previous argument, this
leads to a contradiction. Thus, we have proved that in this case UA ⊆ UB.
We are left with the case that uA (pB) < uA
(
p
B
)
for every uA ∈ UA. Let Charlie be a
decision maker with the exact opposite multiple-utility representation with respect to Bob
(UC = −UB). Observe that Charlie is as decisive as Bob. This implies that Alice is more
decisive than Charlie. Let pC = pB and pC = pB. Observe that uA (pC) > uA
(
p
C
)
for
every uA ∈ UA. By using the proof of the previous case, it follows that UA ⊆ UC = −UB,
which completes the proof.  (2).
4.5.2 Multiple-Prior Representation
We begin by proving Proposition 3, which characterizes ∗ in terms of the representation:
Proposition Let C be a choice correspondence over L that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4. Let
u be the utility and P the set of priors in the multiple-prior representation. Then for
each f, g ∈ L: f ∗ g ⇔ f II g ⇔∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)).
PROOF. It is immediate that f ∗ g ⇒ f II g, and that ∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) ≥
Ep (u (g))⇒ f ∗ g. We now show that f II g ⇒∀p ∈ P, Ep (u (f)) ≥ Ep (u (g)).
Assume to the contrary that there exists p0 ∈ P such that Ep0 (u (g)) > Ep0 (u (f)).
17 Extending each utility u from 4 (X) to R|X|, a standard separation theorem yields a signed
unit vector v (possibly with negative values) such that uA (v) > uB (v) for each uB ∈ UB. This
vector v induces the two lotteries q, r ∈ Y as follows: q = v+‖v+‖ (and q = p if v+ = ~0) and
r = v
−
‖v−‖ (and r = p if v
− = ~0), where v+i = max (vi, 0) and v
−
i = -min (vi, 0).
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We have to show that there exist A ∈ L and h ∈ A, such that h ∈ C (A ∪ {f}) and
h 6∈ C (A) ∪ {g}. Let x, x ∈ X be alternatives such that u (x) < u (x). For each  > 0, let
h = x + (0.5− ) f + 0.5g, and let A = {h, (2x+ (1− 2) f)}. For suﬃciently small
, Ep0 (u (h)) ≥ Ep0 (u (f)) and Ep0 (u (h)) ≥ Ep0 (u (2x+ (1− 2) f)). This implies
that h ∈ C (A ∪ {f}). In addition, for every  > 0 and every p ∈ P , Ep (u (h)) <
Ep (u (x+ (0.5− ) f + 0.5g)) = 0.5Ep (u (2x+ (1− 2) f))+0.5Ep (u (g)). This implies
that h /∈ C (A ∪ {g}). 
Next we prove Lemma 2, which shows that a decision maker has complete preferences if
and only if her set of priors is a singleton:
Lemma 2 Let C be a choice correspondence over L that satisﬁes axioms B0-B4. Let P
be the set of priors in the multiple-prior representation. Then the decision maker has
complete preferences if and only if P is a singleton.
PROOF. The `if' part is straightforward. The `only if' part is proved as follows. Assume
that the decision maker has complete preferences (i.e., relation ./∗ is empty). Assume to
the contrary that there are p1 6= p2 ∈ P . The fact that p1 6= p2 implies that there are
s1, s2 ∈ S such that: p1 (s1) > p2 (s1) and p2 (s2) > p1 (s2). Let x, x ∈ X be alternatives
such that u (x) < u (x). Let
f1 =
x s1x all other states , and f2 =
x s2x all other states .
It follows that Ep1 (u (f1)) > Ep2 (u (f1)) and Ep2 (u (f2)) > Ep1 (u (f2)) and by Corollary
3 f1 ./
∗ f2.  (Lemma 2)
Finally, we prove Proposition 4, which characterizes when Alice is more decisive than Bob
in terms of a multiple-prior representation. It shows that Alice is more decisive if: 1) Alice
has a single prior, or 2) Alice's set of priors is included in Bob's set of priors, and in
addition Alice's utility is equal to Bob's utility or exactly the opposite of Bob's utility.
Proposition 4 Let Alice and Bob be two decision makers with respective choice cor-
respondences (CA, CB) over L that satisfy axioms B0-B4 with respective multiple-prior
representations ((uA, PA) , (uB, PB)). Then Alice is more decisive than Bob if and only
if at least one of the following holds:
(1) PA is a singleton (includes a single prior).
(2) PA ⊆ PB and uA = uB (up to positive linear transformations).
(3) PA ⊆ PB and uA = −uB (up to positive linear transformations).
PROOF. The `if' part is straightforward. The `only if' part is proved as follows. Assume
that Alice is more decisive than Bob and that Alice has incomplete preferences. By Lemma
3 PA is not a singleton. Let xB, xB ∈ X be elements such that: 1) uB (xB) > uB (xB),
and 2) for each x ∈ X uB (xB) ≥ uB (x) ≥ uB (xB). Let f0, g0 ∈ L be elements that Alice
is indecisive between them (f0 ./
∗
A g0, such elements exist because Alice has incomplete
preferences).
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We begin by showing that uA (xB) 6= uA (xB). If uA (xB) = uA (xB), then by Proposition
4, for suﬃciently small  > 0, Bob is decisive between (1− )xB+f0 and (1− )xB+g0,
while Alice is indecisive between these alternatives.
Case 1: Assume ﬁrst that uA (xB) > uA (xB). Normalize utilities uA and uB to satisfy
uB (xB) = uA (xB) = 1 and uB (xB) = uA (xB) = 0. We show that for every x ∈ X,
0 ≤ uA (x) ≤ 1. Assume to the contrary that there exists x ∈ X with uA (x) > 1
(uA (x) < 0). There there exists 0 < α < 1 such that 1 = uA (xB) = uA (αx+ (1− α)xB)
(0 = uA (xB) = uA (αx+ (1− α)xB)). For suﬃciently small  > 0, Alice is indecisive
between (1− )xB + f0 and (1− ) (αx+ (1− α)xB) + g0 (between (1− )xB + f0)
and (1− ) (αx+ (1− α)xB) + g0 ) while Bob is decisive (he prefers the ﬁrst act).
Next, we show that for each x ∈ X uA (x) = uB (x). Assume to the contrary that α =
uA (x) 6= uB (x) where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. For suﬃciently small  > 0, Alice is indecisive between
(1− )x+f0 and (1− ) (αxB + (1− α)xB)+g0 , while Bob is decisive (contradiction).
This shows that both decision makers have the same utility. Let u = uA = uB . We
now prove that PA ⊆ PB . Assume to the contrary that PA 6⊆ PB. Let pA ∈ PA\PB. By a
standard separation theorem (using the convexity and the compactness of PB, see footnote
17) there are f, g ∈ L such that 1 > α = EpA (u (f)− u (g)) > EpB (u (f)− u (g)) for each
pB ∈ PB. Let β = maxpB∈PBEpB (u (r)− u (q)). Assume ﬁrst that there is p′A ∈ PA such
that γ = Ep′A (u (f)− u (g)) 6= α. By the convexity of PA we can assume that β < γ. This
implies that Alice is indecisive between these acts
1
1 + α+γ
2
f +
(
1− 1
1 + α+γ
2
)
xB and
1
1 + α+γ
2
g +
(
1− 1
1 + α+γ
2
)
xB
(because if γ > α then the ﬁrst act is better according to p′A and the second act is better
according to pA and if γ < α the opposite holds), while Bob is decisive (the second act
is better according to all of Bob's utilities) - a contradiction. We are left with the case
that Ep′A (u (f)− u (g)) = α for every p′A ∈ PA. As PA is not a singleton, there are h ∈ L
and p1A, p
2
A ∈ PA such that Ep1A (u (h)) > Ep2A (u (h)). For suﬃciently small δ > 0, f ′ =
(1− δ) f+δh and g′ = (1− δ) g+δh satisfy: 1) Ep1A (u (f ′)− u (g′)) , Ep2A (u (f ′)− u (g′)) >
EpB (u (f
′)− u (g′)) for each pB ∈ PB, 2) Ep1A (u (f ′)− u (g′)) 6= Ep2A (u (f ′)− u (g′)). By
the previous argument, this leads to a contradiction. Thus, we have proved that in this
case PA ⊆ PB.
Case 2: Let Charlie be a decision maker with the opposite of Bob's utility (uC = −uB)
and the same set of priors as Bob (PC = PB). This implies that Alice and Charlie ﬁts
case 1. By the proof of this case, uA = uC = −uB and PA ⊆ PC = PB, which completes
the proof.
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